Introd uction
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 have created tradeable emission permits to control sulfur dioxide polIution. A perlnit allows the emission of up to one ton of sulfur dioxide by its holder. Any firm affect.ed by the act can emit at most as many tons of sulfur dioxide as the number of permits held. These permits can be traded and to facilitate this process the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducts annual auctions.
The EPA auction works as follows. Potential sellers submit sealed ask prices and potential buyers submit sealed bid prices. Buyers and sellers may make multiple submissions. The bid prices are ranked from the highest to the lowest while ask prices are ranked from lowest to highest. No exchange occurs if the lowest ask price exceeds the highest bid price. If the lowest ask price does not exceed the highest bid price, these two bidders are matched. and the buyer pays the seller his bid price in exchange for one permito This matching process continues in ascending order of specified ask price until ali bids are awarded, permits offered are sold out, or alI remaining ask prices exceed remaining bid prices.
Research in the area of mechanisms for trading pollution rights has been concentrated in two areas: the optimal design of institutions,l and in the evaluation of existing permit systems. 2 We add to the latter literature.
3
The complexity of double-auctioning games makes the calculation of equilibria difficult. To make auctioning games tractable some simplifying assumptions are made. For example, one side of the market behaves nonstrategicaliy and each player on the other side of the market follows the same bidding function. 4 In this paper we consider the case where both sellers and buyers behave strategicaliy under full information about the actual distribution of buyers and sellers. We show that the Nash equilibria under fuH information are either inefficient with no trade or efficient where ali trades occur at a nniform price.
We also provide examples of an EPA auction game with incomplete information. We give examples when the uniform price equilibrium holds and when it does noto hold. When the uniform price equilibrium holds, some sellers actualiy shade t.heir bids up and buyers shade their bids down in equilibrium. In the example where the uniform price equilibrium does not hold, buyers shade their bids down in equilibrium and sellers bid zero.
The Model
The players consist of a finite number, n ~ 1, of sellers and a finite number, m ;:::: 1, of buyers. Let N = {I, ... , n} denote the set of sellers and M = {n + 1, ... , n + m} denote the set of buyers. Each seller has one unit of an identical good and each buyer has no units of the good. Each player wants at most one unit of the good. In the sealed bid auction each buyer j E M independent.ly proposes an offer b j and each seller i E N independently proposes an ask price ai. This happens simultaneously. The goods are exchanged in the following way. Order and label by superscripts the offers from highest to lowest, Le., b (a, b) denote the probability that seller i is matched with buyer j when strategy combination (a, b) is used. For a set A we denote the cardinality of A by #A. Then for any strategy combination (a, b),any i E N, and any j E M the probability % (a, b) is computed as follows:
The formula for % (a, b) says that seller i and buyer j will not be matched, Le., qij(a,b) = O, if: i) j's bid is less than i's ask price, or ii) there are at least as many buyers with bids above b j as there are sellers with asks below or equal to ai, or iii) there are at least as many sellers with asks below ai as there are buyers with bids above or equal to b j . Under i), no match can occur by definition. Under ii), seller i is definitely matched with a buyer bidding more than b j , and under iii), buyer j is definitely matched with some seller asking less than Ui. Seller i and buyer j will be matched with positive probability, i.e., qij (a, b) > O otherwise. In this case % (a, b) equals 1 divided by either the number of buyers bidding b j or the number of sellers asking ai whichever is greater. (a, b_j , bj) for all bj E Bj, and 2) for each
The payoff function
We say that a strategy combination (a, b) is efficient if and only if (a, b) leads to an allocation where the players with the highest values each have one unit of the good and the other players have none. 5 
Main Results
Next we show that in every Nash eqlúlibrium all buyers who obtain goods submit the same bids. Proof: We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that (a, b) is a strategy combination and for some buyers j and j' who obtained goods at the auction bj =f:. bj'.
Without 1058 of generality assume that b j > bj'. Since j' got an object in the auction, any bid above bj' would obtain an object with certainty.
But then (a, b) is not a Nash eq1Úlibrium.O 5Note that every game will have Nash equilibria that are inefficient. For example consider the game where n = 2 selIers value the good at $.5 and m = 2 buyers value the good at SI. Efficiency here requires that all goods are exchanged from selIers to buyers. However, no goods are exchanged in the Nash equilibrium where alI buyers offer $.25 and all selIers ask for $2.
Proposition 1 implies that in equilibrium ali exchanges will take place at a uniform price. In Proposition 2 we show that every Nash equilibrium involving some exchange is efficient. We will need. the following Lemma. 
Consider 2). Since buyer y did not obtain an object at the auction it must be true that by $ p. Propositions 1 and 2 aliow us to break the set of Nash equilibria into two classes: ineflicient eqlúlibria characterized by no exchange since buyers offer too little and sellers ask too much; and eflicient equilibria characterized by a uniform " price.
Do uniform-price equilibria occur with incomplete information?
In this section we look at two examples of games of incomplete information with independent private values. In the first example we construct a Nash equilibrium under which ali exchanges occur at a uniform price with probability one. In the second example, we construct a Nash equilibrium that does not involve a uniform price.
Example 1: There are m buyers and n sellers, with m = n. Values are independently distributed. Each seller's value is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] and each buyer's value is uniformly distributed on the interval [2, 3] . Each player knows his own value but only the distributions of the remaining players values. Ali buyers and sellers are risk neutral.
Let's see that a strategy combination requiring every player to submit a 3 price p = 2 regardless of their values constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Consider an arbitrary buyer j with value Vj who expects that the other buyers and sellers will submit~. If he submits a bid below ~ his payoff is zero since he is not matched. If he bids at least ~, his payoff is Vj -~, since he will definitely be matched. His payoff is maximized by setting b j = ~ ,and Vj ~ 2. A similar argument holds for an arbitrary seller.
Notice that if there is any dispersion of bids in the above example, then sellers would have an incentive to shade their bids down to zero. However, this cannot be supported by N ash play, since buyers would then jump down to zero as well.
A elose examination of example 1 provides us with two features that seem crucial for the uniform-price equilibrium to hold in the incomplete information framework: 1) the number ofbuyers equals the number ofsellers and, 2) all buyers' values are strictly greater than all sellers' values. These two assumptions allow the players to "focus" on any price p that lies between the minimum possible valuation for a buyer and maximum possible valuation for a seller as a Nash equilibrium. In the next example, we modify the second feature, namely, we consider the case where there are more buyers than sellers (m > n).
Example 2: Everything is the same as in example 1 except m > n. The strategies of example 1 require each player to submit the same price p regardless af their true values. We show that this cannot be a Nash equilibrium. If p E [1, 2] , as in example 1, a particular buyer gets an object with proban n bility -. Thus, buyer j would get an expected payoff of -(Vj -p). But m m by increasing her bid by an arbitrarily small amOlmt ê, her expected payoff becomes (Vi -P -ê). For any finite number of buyers we can always find sufficiently small ê to make her increase her bid by this much. If p E [0,1) then a seller with value of 1 could obtain a higher expected payoff from submitting 1 rather than p. If p > 2 then a buyer with a value of 2 could obtain a higher expected payoff by submitting a bid of 2.
It can be verified that the following strategy profile is an equilibrium: (:=D[Vjri [l-Vj] i-l is the probability that Vj is one of the n highest values.
Notice that buyers and sellers use symmetric strategies. The symmetric seller's strategy informs a seller to ask zero regardless of his valuation. The symmetric buyer's strategy informs a buyer to bid the expected value of the n th highest buyer conditional on the n th highest buyer being below her. Notice that the buyer's strategy is an increasing function of his true value. For any seller i, bidding anything different from zero will guarantee him to be matched with the n th highest bid or no bid. By bidding zero, he has a l/n chance of being matched with each of the n highest bids. Therefore, asking zero (the lower bound) maximizes his expected payoff. A buyer will behave as in a multi-unit auction where n identical units are sold at a zero reservation value yielding the above equilibrium buyers' strategies.
In example 2, the number of buyers being greater than the number of sellers was crucial to obtain the equilibrium described. Competition amongst buyers forced all final prices to be in the buyers support. Given this result, one might be tempted to conjecture that if the number of sellers is greater than the number of buyers, then we can find an equilibrium where sellers shade their bids and buyers enter identical price bids. However, this is not true. The reason stems from the different treatment of buyers and sellers in the EPA auction. We conjecture that if an equilibrium exists in this case it wiIl involve non-uniform price bids that all lie in the sellers support. Intuitively, if buyers submit bid prices above the sellers support, all sellers would compete for the highest price by asking zero. This cannot be an equilibrium since buyers would have an incentive to bid zero as well.
Conclusion
In this paper we examine the outcome of a stylized version of the EPA auctions with complete information. We show that there are either inefficient equilibria (where no goods are exchanged) or efficient equilibria (where ali possible gains from trades are realized). The efficient equilibria have the property that ali trades occur at a uniform price.
We provided an example of the EPA auctions game under incomplete information where a uniform-price equilibrium holds. This example shows that it is possible to have sellers shading their bids up when both buyers and sellers behave strategically, the number of buyers is equal to the number of sellers and the supports of values do not intersect. We also provided an example under incomplete information where a Nash equilibrium involves both buyers and sellers shading their bids down. In general, it seems that the types of equilibria that will arise in the incomplete information case depend on 1) the number of buyers relative to the number of sellers and 2) whether or not the buyers and sellers supports intersect. Clearly more research is needed. to characterize the equilibria of these garnes under incomplete information. Additional work is also needed to generalize our analysis to the case where buyers and sellers have multi-unit trading capacities and to incorporate the existence of a secondary market.
